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Abstract We summarize recent developments in the credit derivative mar-
kets. We show the role of dependence between individual debtors in portfolio
derivatives in a study of implied correlation. The risk of changing dependence
structures between stock and bond markets becomes evident in an example of
capital structure arbitrage. How credit derivatives can introduce new risks is
illustrated by the example of “overlay” in basket derivatives.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the credit derivative markets have seen rapid growth in terms
of the notional of contracts, reaching USD 12,400 bn in June 2005, and their
liquidity. The rapid development of new products and the increase of their trad-
ing volume and liquidity have a strong impact on credit portfolio management.
These instruments offer not only new investment opportunities in credit risky
instruments, but also broaden the possibilities for managing credit portfolios.
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In contrast to interest rate management, where the use of derivatives, in par-
ticular of swaps, is common practice, many participants in the market for credit
risk still do not use credit derivatives neither for investing nor for hedging pur-
poses. By now, actively traded instruments include single-name credit default
swap contracts and (standardized) collateralized debt obligations. These allow
for cost-efficient hedges of idiosyncratic and systematic risks in credit markets.
Moreover, new instruments emerge: recovery default swaps allow for separat-
ing the default risk of a debtor from its recovery risk, and credit swaptions or
constant maturity swaps can be used to hedge a portfolio against increasing
credit risk premiums.
The advantage of credit derivatives as compared to credit risky bonds is that
they are much easier to buy and sell. Especially, credit derivatives allow for
an efficient implementation of short positions in the credit market, whereas
short-selling a cash bond involving the repo-market is not cost-efficient.
Also, these new instruments have major implications for the active man-
agement of credit portfolios. The “old school” of credit portfolio management
focused primarily on loan portfolios and thus on default risk, meaning that risk
managers simply tried to avoid “bad” exposure to minimize losses stemming
from occuring defaults. In a buy-and-hold context, sophisticated rating-ori-
ented models are needed to identify the “cherries”, the names that will not
default, and to avoid the “lemons”, the names that will default. Hence, for
private loan portfolios, the major value-driver with respect to credit risk is an
advanced statistical model that has high discriminative power. For commer-
cial loans, on the other hand, fundamental balance sheet analysis with respect
to the credit quality of the creditor is key. “Old school” investment strategies
are mainly carry-oriented. Credit spreads generate additional income on fixed
income portfolios. This approach is especially common for investors from asset
and liability management who shift their investments to lower credit quality,
as risk free yields decrease, to achieve the return needed by their liability side.
This fundamental single-name related view ignores the cyclical nature of credit
quality and correlation patterns within asset classes.
In the “new school” of credit portfolio management, default risk is not the
only factor that has to be taken into account. Spread risk, which quantifies the
credit-specific price component of an instrument, motivates a more active port-
folio management approach. Spread changes stem from changes of the market
participants’ assessment of default risk, which can be either idiosyncratic or
of systematic nature. As a consequence, similar management techniques as for
stock portfolios are applicable to credit portfolios in liquid credit markets. In
addition, the development in the securitization market enables investors and
risk managers to trade even illiquid exposures such as consumer loans. More-
over, correlation patterns have to be viewed as dynamic variables rather than
as static quantities, since long-term correlation patterns might decouple in the
short term.
An increasing number of articles by academics and practitioners has been
published on the valuation of credit-risky instruments during the last years.
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These articles tend to cover valuation methods of new innovative instruments1,
credit risk modeling topics 2, and especially in the recent past on new develop-
ments regarding Copula functions and approaches to adequately price correla-
tion instruments such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)3.
However, there is still little literature dealing with the management of liquid
credit portfolios. Credit risk modeling for single debtors is definitely a cru-
cial part of portfolio valuation methods. However, not only the joint default
probability of all instruments in the portfolio has to be understood, but also
the joint spread movements. Consequently, the dependence structure between
different instruments becomes increasingly important. Analyzing the impact
of derivatives on a credit portfolio necessarily requires an understanding of
the mechanism and price sensitivities of these instruments, especially to the
“new” risk factors such as correlation changes. The strong impact of correlation
changes on the prices of certain instruments is shown in the next section.
Portfolio optimization techniques experienced a lot of attention during the
last decades. Improvements of the traditional portfolio selection approach tend
to be the modifications of the mean-variance methodology along the lines of
Black and Litterman (1992). However, the huge majority of literature is still
related to the optimization process of equity portfolios, while credit portfo-
lios, or even portfolios that include both classes of instruments are comparably
neglected. The interrelation of movements in equity and debt markets is the
basis of capital structure arbitrage trades, a popular hedge-fund strategy. An
example of the risk from the comovement of prices in capital structure arbitrage
trades is given below.
The strong growth and the increasing importance of the credit derivatives
markets in terms of outstanding notional and the emerge of new products
reduces transaction cost and makes markets more efficient. How credit deriva-
tives introduce new risks, making credit portfolio management more challeng-
ing, will be the third part of our contribution.
2 Correlation risk
A class of credit instruments exposed to correlation risk are collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). We illustrate the role of correlation changes in a study of
CDO spreads during 2005.
A CDO distributes the default losses occuring in a portfolio to a number
of credit risky notes Ni, i = 1, . . . ,n according to certain well-specified rules.
Typically, a note Ni suffers all the losses in the portfolio from an attachment
1 See, for example, the books by Ammann (2001), Schönbucher (2003), or Bielecki and Rutkowski
(2002).
2 See, for example, Giesecke (2004) or Brigo and Errais (2005).
3 E.g. Li (2000), Hull and White (2005); see Burtschell et al. (2005) for an presentation of CDO
valuation models and Finger (2005) for an overview of open research questions.
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level Ki−1 up to a detachment level Ki. Andersen and Sidenius (2005) give an
overview of CDO pricing models.
Today, most generally accepted approaches to CDO pricing are from the
class of copula models and often written in the form of a factor model [see, for
example, Burtschell et al. (2005)]. The free parameters in the models used to
calibrate it to market prices are the dependence parameters, the correlations
between the price driving factors. Since the underlying portfolio of aCDOmight
easily contain hundreds of different debtors, a huge number of parameters the-
oretically enters into the CDO pricing model. In order to simplify and speed
up calculations, it is common to assume a constant default probability for all
and a constant dependence structure between all debtors in the portfolio. This
simplification reduces the number of parameters used to calibrate the model
to market prices to two, which practically eliminates the possibility to calibrate
themodel to different tranche prices. However, market participants have begun
quoting the model implied correlation for each tranche as a means to commu-
nicate prices. McGinty et al. (2004) suggest to calculate the implied correlations
in a specific way, which they refer to as “base-correlations”: For a specific CDO
they aggregate tranches consecutively to obtain synthetic tranches with attach-
ment at 0 and detachment at the respective detachment points of the tranches.
The values of these synthetic first loss tranches are then calibrated to market
spreads successively starting from the tranche with the lowest detachment level.
Even though this basic procedure is accepted among market participants, indi-
vidual model specifications can lead to large price deviations. Thus, also implied
correlations, which can strongly depend on the model specification, disperse.
In the context of CDO pricing, implied correlations take a similar role as
implied volatilities for option prices: for a given model, they constitute a differ-
ent way to quote prices. However, the role of correlation risk in the pricing
of portfolio credit derivatives is not so well-understood. We will illustrate the
importance of correlation changes in the following example.
2.1 The correlation crisis
The CDO we consider here is the iTraxx S3 CDO. The underlying portfolio of
credit risky instruments is the iTraxx CDS index. It consists of the 125 most
actively traded CDS contracts on European companies. We investigate the first
two tranches, equity and mezzanine, of this CDO with attachment–detachment
levels of 0 and 3%, and 3 and 6%, respectively.
In the first quarter of 2005, hedge funds and proprietary trading desks of
banks entered long positions in the equity tranche (attachment-detachment
0-3%) of the ITraxx CDO while shorting the mezzanine tranche (attachment–
detachment 3-6%). Themotivation for this tradewas the expectation that credit
spreads would remain relatively stable in 2005. Thinking in “old school” dimen-
sions, these trading positions generated positive carry. Moreover, most trades
were structured to be delta-neutral (meaning they were immune against sys-
tematic spread moves), thus also taking into account some “new school” ideas.
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However, these positions had an exposure to changes in portfolio correlation.
The evolution of spreads on the index and on themezzanine tranche is displayed
in Figure 1; that of the mezzanine tranche and the equity tranche in Figure 2.
Note that the iTraxx equity tranche is not quoted as a quarterly spread but
as an advance payment relative to the tranche notional. We can see that the
spread on the mezzanine tranche declines during the observation period, while
the upfront payment on the equity tranche peaks in May 2005 and is relatively
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Fig. 1 Evolution of the iTraxx index and of the 3–6% tranche of the iTraxx S3 CDO tranche. Data
Source: Bloomberg, HVB Global Markets Research
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Fig. 2 Top: Evolution of the iTraxx S3 3–6% spread, Bottom: evolution of the iTraxx S3 equity
tranche spread. Data Source:Bloomberg, HVB Global Markets Research
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stable at about 25% for the rest of the time. The spreads on the iTraxx index
are relatively stable at around 40 basis points (bp), with the exception of May
2005 when they rise to about 60 bp for a short period of time, triggering the so
called “correlation crises”. We want to point out the falling spread on the mez-
zanine tranche during 2005 in contrast to the stable index spreads. The increase
in index spreads in May 2005 was driven only by a couple of names and thus
was accompanied by an increase in the dispersion of credit spreads between
different debtors in the index.
To quantify this effect and to relate it to the correlation implied in mar-
ket spreads, we use the large homogeneous portfolio approximation (LHP)
suggested by Vasicek (1977).
The underlying assumptions of the LHP are a constant identical default
probability for all debtors in the portoflio and a constant identical correlation
between all debtors.We clarify themeaning of correlation in this context below.
Today, the LHP would be characterized as a (one-factor) Gaussian Copula
model.
We obtain an estimate for the default probability from the premium of a
hypothetical CDS contract. The price of such a contract is quoted as the spread s
whichmakes the expected value of the premium side of the contract equal to the
expected value of the protection side. We assume that the contract is priced at
t0 = 0 and the times of premium payments are t1, . . . , tT . In the case of default,
which we assume to happen immediately before the ti, the seller of the contract
suffers a loss of L = 60%. The pricing equation now reads:
L
T∑
i=1
e−ritiP
(
default in (ti−1, ti]
) = s
T∑
i=1
e−ritiP (default after ti) , (1)
where the periodic CDS spread s on the premium side is chosen to satisfy the
equation; the interest rates rt are assumed to be known. The default probability
can be written as P (default before t) = 1 − e−λt. Entering this in (1), we can
solve for
λ = − 1
t
ln
(
0.6
0.6 + s
)
.
We used the spread s of the iTraxx index on each day during the sample period
to obtain an estimate for λ and thus for the default probabilities.
In the LHP default of a company i occurs when a latent variable, e.g., the firm
value, falls below a specified level, e.g., the value of debt. This factor is written
as
Xi = αM +
√
1 − α2Wi,
whereM is a standard normally distributed common factor to all companies and
Wi is an idiosyncratic factor for each company, which is also standard normal.
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The correlation between the latent variables of any two debtors is assumed to
be fully captured by the common factor and is α2. This correlation is the cor-
relation we will solve later. Using this factor for a given default probability the
default barrier can be found. Calculating the default probabilities conditional
on a realization of the common factor and assuming an infinite number of obli-
gors in the portfolio, Vasicek (1977) obtains the distribution for the relative loss
of the portfolio. From this distribution the expected losses on CDO tranches
can be calculated. Using these, the pricing equation for the CDO tranche with
attachment point Ki−1 and detachment point Ki is similar to that of the CDS:
T∑
i=1
e−riti
(
ELKi−1,Ki(ti) − ELKi−1,Ki(ti−1)
) = (2)
s
T∑
i=1
e−riti
(
1− ELKi−1,Ki(ti−1)
)
, (3)
where ELKi−1,Ki(t) denotes the expected loss for the tranche for a time
horizon t.
We apply this formula to market prices and extract the correlation param-
eter implied in prices of the equity and the 3–6% tranche for daily data from
March 2005 to January 2006. The results are displayed in Figure 3. Even though
this simple model and estimation procedure neglect parameter dynamics, it can
illustrate the changes of implied correlation over time. Implied correlations of
the two tranches comove over the entire sample. FromMarch tomid-May 2005,
the implied correlation of the equity tranche drops from around 30% to around
12%; that of the 3–6% tranche drops from around 10% close to 0%. This drop
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Fig. 3 Top: Evolution of the iTraxx S3 3–6% implied correlation, Bottom: evolution of the iTraxx
S3 equity tranche implied correlation
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is called the correlation crisis. After the drop, correlations on both tranches
increase again with the correlation for the equity tranche trading around 15%
and that of themezzanine tranche at around 10%,which roughly is the pre-crisis
level.
The influence of correlations on the tranche values is not the same across
tranches: while the spread on themezzanine tranche decreases (value increases)
as the correlation declines, the equity tranche upfront payment increases (value
decreases) as implied correlation rises. This is because the value of the equity
tranche is determined by losses between 0 and 3% of the portfolio. The proba-
bility of these increases as the correlation declines. Conversely, the probability
of losses affecting the mezzanine tranches of a CDO generally increases as the
correlation increases. Thus, the rapid decline of implied correlation fromMarch
to mid-May 2005 indicates a rapid increase in the value of the 3–6% tranche
and a decrease of the value of the equity tranche, as illustrated in Figure 2.
To illustrate the importance of correlation risk we want to stress that individ-
ual CDS spreads (and default risk) increase by around 50% in the crisis. Naively
thinking, one would thus have expected increasing spreads for all tranches.
As a consequence of the price movements, the trading positions described
suffered big losses.Moreover, many of these positions were held by hedge funds
which were highly levered. These trades had to be unwound as collateral was
exhausted and brought some funds to the edge of bankruptcy.
In the aftermath of the “correlation crisis” a discussion about a possiblemod-
ification of the standard Gaussian copula model emerged. However, the trigger
for this crisis was not a failure of the models used but rather a speculative bet
on the wrong side of the market.
Even though the role of implied correlation is similar to that of implied
volatility, it is difficult to quantify a premium for correlation risk. It is hardly
possible to observe realized correlation since the model is based on latent pro-
cesses. A more detailed discussion of open questions in CDO pricing from is
Finger (2005). An approach for estimating correlation risk is undertaken in
Albanese et al. (2005).
3 Capital structure arbitrage
The class of structural models in the line of Merton (1974) is the basis of strat-
egies of trading simultaneously in debt and equity markets. These so-called
capital structure arbitrage strategies are popular among hedge funds. The idea
is to exploit pricing anomalies between different instruments of the same issuer,
say stocks, stock options, and credit risky instruments. Theoretically, a structural
model, given all relevant parameters, allows to price all these instruments in a
consistent, arbitrage-free way. Besides calibration issues, empirical tests such
as recently by Eom et al. (2004) show that models, calibrated to equity market
prices and debt markets, tend to underestimate the credit spreads for debtors
of lower quality and to overestimate the spread for debtors of higher quality.
This is frequently seen as a drawback of structural models. Henrotte (2006)
Recent developments in credit markets 229
argues that there is the possibility of sudden dramatic changes in the capital
structure of a company because of the possibility of a leveraged-buy-out or
because of takeovers of or by other firms. In spite of all these shortcomings, the
class of structured form models is generally accepted as reasonably describing
the interrelations between different financial instruments among academics and
practitioners.
A prominent and recent example for capital structure arbitrage trades are
the debt/equity trades on General Motors (GM), one of the largest issuers of
corporate bonds in the US. The trades involved stock, stock options, bonds,
and CDS and we investigate the period of early 2005. Despite an anticipated
downgrade of the issuer, GM bonds offered spreads considered as attractive
by many in that period. Thus, speculators entered into a long position in GM
bonds, which they hedged by short positions in GM stocks. Some market par-
ticipants substituted the short equity position with a long volatility position
using GM options. The rationale of the trade was based on the assumption
that a spread increase would be accompanied by a drop in stock prices or an
increase in implied option volatility. The relative size of the trading positions
were determined by the use of structural models.
In structural models equity value and the default probability are basically
determined by the ratio of debt to firm value and by firm value volatility. While
the value of equity can be observed directly, the volatility and the debt have to
be estimated either from historical data or implied quantities can be extracted
frommarket prices. The evolution of the GM stock market capitalization of the
implied volatility from put options and of the 5-year CDS spread is displayed
in Figure 4. Most of the time CDS spread declines as the capitalization of GM
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Fig. 4 The market capitalization of GM (left scale), the 5-year CDS spread (right scale), and the
put-option implied volatility (left scale) principally show the behavior that is expected from struc-
tural models. The rapid changes of all series in the last (marked) part of the sample period, however,
has a strong impact on trading positions. Data Source: HVB Global Markets Research
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stocks increases and the CDS spread rises when volatility rises as described
by structured form models. However, in the last part of the sample all three
quantities change drastically. Especially, implied volatility fluctuates rapidly.
A reason for this could be a restructuring of GM debt becoming more proba-
ble. Restructuring is a credit event in CDS contracts and has an unclear effect on
share prices. Thus, a more probable restructuring introduces more uncertainty
into prices.
The rapid movements lead not to a breakdown of the structured form mod-
els but forced large adjustments of the relative sizes of trading positions. Since
manymarket participants were forced to adjust their positions at the same time,
this amplified market movements. Several capital structure arbitrage desks that
suffered dramatic losses had to close out their positions.
The case of GM is also studied by Finger and Stamicar (2005) who extract
the debt-per-share value from GM stockprices, option prices, and CDS quotes
using their CreditGrades model from accounting data and from market prices.
As suggested by Hull et al. (2004/2005) they find a higher explanatory power if
they use option implied quantities to calibrate their model.
4 New risks from credit derivatives
The strong growth of the credit derivatives market in terms of the outstanding
amount of notional as well as regarding the product development is accom-
panied by a shift in the basic incentive to use credit derivatives, and also has
a strong impact on pricing issues. According to Fitch (2005), trading rather
than hedging has become the major incentive to use credit derivatives in the
global banking sector. This means that the holding periods decline on aver-
age, causing rising spread volatility and creating additional demand for hedging
instruments, thus leading to a further growth of the credit derivative market. In
any case, (credit) derivative instruments increase transparency and efficiency in
themarket, but can also induce new risks through rising leverage which can lead
to increasing volatility in case credit events. In addition, the deviating growth
in credit derivative and cash bond markets can lead to a mismatch between
derivative (notional) and actual cash positions for specific reference entities.
This mismatch was highlighted in the aftermath of the chapter 11 filing of
US auto supplier Delphi on 8 October 2005. Outstanding cash bonds with a
notional of USD 2 bn faced an outstanding protected volume of notional in
indices, synthetic CDOs, and single name CDS of around USD 10bn. As phys-
ical settlement is the market standard for single-name CDS and credit indices,
many market participants who did not have the reference obligations on their
books had to buy them to settle their contracts in a default case. This exces-
sive demand for Delphi bonds propelled up prices (“short squeeze”), even
though these higher levels did not adequately reflect the economic loss. While
Delphi bonds were quoted at a cash-level of 57% shortly after filing for bank-
ruptcy, prices of distressed debt recovered to around 70% in late October and
early November 2005 on the back of concerns about a paper shortage. Market
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Fig. 5 The prices of four bonds issued by Delphi. Data Source: Bloomberg, HVB Global Markets
Research
participants cleared this situation by arranging an auction to determine refer-
ence prices for Delphi bonds. On 4 November 2005, this auction-determined
price wasUSD63.375 perUSD100 of notional. After the auction,Delphi bonds
traded betweenUSD 50 andUSD 60. The price movement is shown in Figure 5.
The Delphi case is an example for the strong impact of credit derivatives on
the market pricing of credit-risky instruments. The situation when derivative
notional is larger than actual debt is referred to as “overlay” in the CDO busi-
ness. It occurs becausemanyCDO transactions are driven by “rating arbitrage”:
CDO arrangers prefer the names that pay the highest spreads in a specific rat-
ing class. Since the number of issuers whose market implied rating deviates
significantly from that of a rating agency is limited, overlay in the CDOmarket
is seen frequently.
Because of overlay, themarket impact from single-namedefaults has changed
from a pure idiosyncratic nature to a more systematic nature. This can be seen
as a new risk which caused by credit derivatives. Thus, the strong growth of
the credit derivatives market leads not only to new investment and hedging
opportunities but also to the emergence of new risk factors. These new factors
in turn force portfolio managers to implement a more active management style.
5 Conclusion
The market for credit derivatives has seen a rapid growth in recent years in
terms of outstanding volume of notional and liquidity. New products offer
new opportunities to investing, hedging, and trading in credit markets. How-
ever, as markets become more liquid and transparent, the important role of
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dependence becomes even more evident. We show that correlations implied in
credit portfolio derivatives changes significantly over time and strongly impacts
market prices. Moreover, we illustrate the crucial role of the understanding of
dependence structures between stock and bond markets in capital structure
arbitrage trades. A direct dependence through “overlay” illustrates that new
risks can emerge through developments in credit derivativemarkets.We believe
that increasing liquidity in credit derivative markets will allow both academics
and practitioners to further investigate and understand the (joint) behavior of
price movements in debt and equity markets.
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